We estimate the relationship between psychological attributes of U.S. Army recruits soon after enlistment and their propensity to leave service. We find that those with the worst psychological health are more likely to terminate employment, and we show how identifying psychologically unfit candidates prior to their employment can reduce the likelihood of future turnover and associated personnel costs. These findings have broad application to other stressful occupations such as firefighters, policemen, and first-responders.
Theoretically, all of these attributes can influence soldier attrition. They reflect not only insitu psychological health (e.g., depression, affect), but also how a person might respond to stressors endemic to military life (e.g., optimism, catastrophizing). The more contextual and philosophical attributes (e.g., positive affect, spirituality) can reflect how soldiers respond to trust in leadership, and violations of trust can precipitate attrition. Lastly, resilience can stem from a support network, and a lack of friendship (or loneliness) or family support for service in the Army could again precipitate attrition in response to adverse events.
The 105 individual GAT questions are collected as either binary responses or on a five-or 10-point scale. We standardize individual questions to be within a scale of one to five and define the GAT score for each attribute as the average of the individual item responses. We find similar results using different aggregations of the GAT questions (available upon request). For all attributes except two, a higher scale reflects more positive psychological attributes; the two other attributes-depression and catastrophizing-are reverse coded for consistency.
Attrition
The length of a first-term contract for most soldiers is usually three years, but is sometimes four years for certain specific occupations. As available data does not identify term length, we follow the literature (e.g., Golding et al. 2001 ) and define attrition as leaving the Army for any reason except for education prior to their first 36 months of service. In unreported results, we find that the vast majority of attrition occurs with the first year of employment, which suggests that little information is lost by using a three-year attrition window.
Sample
Our sample includes 17,226 enlisted soldiers without prior military service who took GAT within four weeks of starting basic training and whose initial service date was in fiscal year 2010. Before October 1, 2009, the GAT questionnaire was not standardized; for those entering the Army after October 1, 2010, we do not have sufficient time to observe 36-month attrition. Table 1 shows that 28% of the sample attrited. The majority of the sample is male, white, single, and has no college education. The average age is 21 years, and only 24% were involved in a combat arms occupation. Attriters more often are female, younger, and single, have a lower Armed Services Qualifying Test (AFQT) score (an ability test taken by potential recruits), and have no post-high school education.
Methods
We first study each GAT attribute independently by comparing the distribution of scores for attriters and non-attriters and presenting attrition rates amongst soldiers in various percentile groups of the study population's GAT distribution.
As employers will likely be concerned with identifying those with the lowest psychological health, we next concentrate on differences between those with the lowest GAT scores and the remainder of the sample. For brevity, we only present results comparing soldiers in the bottom 5 percentiles to those in the top 95 percentiles of the distribution for each attribute. Specifically, we estimate logistic models predicting the likelihood of attrition as a function of being in the lowest 5 percentiles of each attribute, and control for the covariates presented in Table 1 . In unreported analysis, we reach similar conclusions when choosing any other cut-off below the 10 th percentile. Figure 1 shows kernel densities of GAT scores by attrition status. The distributions of all GAT scores are shifted to the left amongst attriters compared to non-attriters (Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests strongly reject the equality of these distributions for all attributes). The magnitude of differences in GAT scores between attriters and non-attriters is largest for depression, positive affect, and adaptability, and smallest for family satisfaction and spirituality. Figure 2 shows one useful way to focus on soldiers with the lowest GAT scores: bar charts of attrition rates within various percentiles of the distribution of GAT scores. For each attribute, the attrition rate is higher in the lowest 5 percentiles compared to the 6 th to 25 th percentiles, and for most attributes, this difference is the largest amongst the percentile groups shown.
Results
We next allow the GAT attributes to jointly predict attrition in a logistic model. Column 1 of Table 2 shows that the largest attrition differences are present for two attributes: depression and adaptability. Conditional on other GAT attributes, those in the bottom 5 percent of the distribution for the depression (the most depressive) are 1.54 times more likely to attrite than those in the top 95 percent of the distribution. Those in the bottom 5 percent for positive affect, optimism, engagement, organizational trust, and family support are also more likely to attrite. Interestingly, low spirituality scores are associated with lower attrition during the first term, which may reflect that spiritual individuals discover they have moral conflicts with the realities of military service.
Controlling for individual-level covariates in column 2 changes the point estimates on GAT variables very little. This suggests that the variation in psychological health is independent of observable demographics, and that the GAT adds meaningfully to the Army's ability to predict future attrition.
Conclusion
We have demonstrated that a set of self-reported questions can predict employee retention. Our results have important implications for recruiting strategies in the Army, and other large organizations with stressful work environments. However, if the Army is to consider using psychometric screening, it must be sure the policy's benefits outweigh its costs.
On one hand, screening out soldiers with low GAT scores will reduce training and personnel costs, as fewer soldiers would need to be hired. On the other hand, screening based on the GAT alone is a blunt policy instrument: many low-GAT recruits (who would be screened out in this policy) would have satisfactorily completed their contractual term, forcing the Army to recruit and train more soldiers.
To illustrate, suppose the Army screens out recruits who scored in the bottom 5 percentiles of the depression attribute before they enter initial training.
1 Compared to the status quo, yearly recruiting expenditures would increase by $15.8 million, but $5.4 million would be saved on enlistment-bonuses and $16.7 million saved in training/personnel costs. Thus, this hypothetical policy would save $6.3 million per year in personnel cost alone, and savings could be higher if the Army chose the screening cut-off optimally. 2 We advocate future research on the relationship between psychological screening and worker retention (or other worker performance measures) across a range of settings with different work stress levels in order to further our understanding of the role and effectiveness of psychological screening on labor market outcomes. Attrition may be costly to the Army because when a soldier leaves the service, the Army must recruit and train a replacement. As noted by May and Hughes (1986) however, the attrition cost to the military is not the full cost of training and replacing a recruit; rather, it is these costs less the benefit that the military has received from having the soldier in service up to the point of attrition. As such, the cost of attrition varies over the first term, increasing during the training process and then decreasing as the soldier provides more productive services to the Army. We evaluate a scenario that would reduce attrition, yet would do so at the cost of needing to replace non-attriting soldiers. Thus, we need to consider the costs and benefits (for personnel costs) of all aspects of this hypothetical policy.
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There would be three types of costs/benefits associated with a policy that screened out the recruits: (1) Higher recruiting costs, as new soldiers would need to be recruited to replace the ones that were recruited but screened out; (2) Lower costs due to fewer accessions and enlistment bonuses needed due to attrition being lower for the soldiers not screened out; and (3) Lower training and personnel cost-with fewer accessions, there are fewer soldiers to train to meet manpower goals.
Our method is predicated on the notion that the cost of attrition varies, depending on when in the first term the attrition occurs. Cost data for FY2011 were provided to us through personal communications with Army officials, and we convert all amounts to FY2010 dollars. Appendix Table 1 , below, summarizes the cost components used in the illustration.
The first step in our simulation is to set a manpower goal for the Army. This will determine how the number of accessions and recruits would need to change in response to the new policy of screening out those in the bottom 5 th percentile of the depression scores. We chose to set the goal as obtaining the same number of "first-term productive soldier-months," defined as the number of soldier-months served after initial training through 3.5 years (about the average first-term length).
With this manpower goal, we calculate the number of recruits that would be needed to achieve that goal, taking into account that a percentage would be disqualified for low scores in the depression category.
Following are the steps for the simulation: 1. Calculate the continuation rates (which is opposite of attrition) for soldiers from the bottom 5% and top 95% of GAT depression scores. We assume that any replacement recruits (for those screened out) would have the same attrition/continuation profile as the top 95% GAT depression scorers. Beyond 36 months, we assume that one percent of remaining soldiers attrite each month. 2. Determine the number of accessions that gives the same number of soldier-months after initial training (69,041). 3. Calculate how many recruits are needed to reach that number of accessions (72, 675) 
